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case was distinguished from *Turner v. Goldsmith* [1891] 1 Q. B. 544, on the ground that there the compensation was to be paid in the form of commissions, and that that impliedly created a contract to find employment for the servant. *Emmens v. Elderton*, 13 C. B. 495, 4 H. L. 624, was thought to be conclusive of the question.

Stirling, L. J., while not formally dissenting, said that he was still impressed with the conviction that plaintiff's contention was not without foundation. It is clear, he said, that the word "employ" is capable of two meanings—to simply retain in service, or to give actual work to be done by the person employed. In the case of a medical man employed for a fixed term, no one would say that work must be found for him." "On the other hand, in the case of an actor who accepts an engagement, it may be an important consideration with him to have an opportunity of displaying his abilities before the public, and it may be that there is an implied obligation on the part of the master to afford such an opportunity: *Fechter v. Montgomery* (1863) 33 Beav. 22." So in the case of a commission agent. In the case at bar there was evidence that opportunity to keep in touch with the trade was essential to plaintiff's success as a salesman, and in this there is some likeness to the case of the actor. On the whole, however, he was not prepared to differ from the conclusion at which the majority had arrived.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—POWER TO REGULATE PUBLIC SPEAKING ON THE STREETS.—The charter of the city of Detroit conferred power upon the council "to control, prescribe and regulate the manner in which the highways, streets, lanes, alleys and public grounds and spaces within said city shall be used and enjoyed." It also conferred power to prevent disorderly noise or disturbance or assemblage in the streets. The common council passed an ordinance forbidding any person from making any public address, etc., in any of the public streets, etc., within one half-mile of the city hall, without a permit from the mayor, designating the time and place. Such a permit could not be issued to the same person for more than one night in any week. Complaint was made before the Recorder's Court against a street preacher for gathering a crowd and preaching in a public street, in violation of this ordinance, but the judge refused to entertain it on the ground that the ordinance was void, as being an unreasonable and unauthorized interference with common right. Mandamus was therefore asked to compel him to entertain the prosecution. Held, that the ordinance was valid, and that it was the duty of the respondent to proceed with the trial of the case. *Love v. Phalen*, (1901), — Mich. —, 87 N. W. Rep. 785, 55 L. R. A. 618.

Such an ordinance is valid: *Commonwealth v. Davis*, (1895) 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. Rep. 113, 44 Am. St. Rep. 389, 26 L. R. A. 712; S. C. 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 731. It does not violate the right of freedom of speech. It does not deprive any one of any legitimate use of the public streets. It does not involve any unlawful delegation of power to the mayor. *Frazee's Case*, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. Rep. 726 Am. St. Rep. 310 is distinguishable. No such arbitrary and invidious discriminations are possible, as were found to be in *State v. Dering*, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. Rep. 1104, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948.

NEGLIGENCE—IMPUTING NEGLIGENCE OF DRIVER OF A VEHICLE TO PASSENGERS.—A party of young people arranged for a picnic. The young men were to furnish the conveyance, and the young ladies were to supply the lunch,—each young lady furnishing lunch for herself and the young gentleman who escorted her, though all the viands were united to make a common lunch at the picnic. The young gentlemen delegated to one of their number, Mr. G., the hiring of the conveyance, and he hired a large omnibus, with four horses and a driver and assistant. Mr. G. sat with the driver, and with his consent drove the horses. The other members of the party sat inside the omnibus, and were not aware that G. was driving. While he was so driving, the omnibus was capsized by reason of the negligently defective condition